On January 28, the French Navy’s Charles de Gaulle Carrier Strike Group made a historic first port call in Indonesia as part of its deployment to the Indo-Pacific under the “Clemenceau 25” Mission. The visit also preceded the French Navy-led “La Perouse 25,” an unprecedented naval exercise involving nine countries – France, Australia, Canada, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, the United States, and the United Kingdom – that took place in the Malacca, Sunda, and Lombok straits.
Three days later, French Minister of the Armed Forces Sébastien Lecornu met with President Prabowo Subianto, Indonesian Defense Minister Sjafrie Sjamsoeddin, and Foreign Minister Sugiono. The next day, Sjafrie and top Indonesian National Armed Forces (TNI) officials boarded the Charles de Gaulle Carrier in Lombok, West Nusa Tenggara.
Jakarta’s decision to allow Paris to organize a multinational military exercise in its three critical maritime chokepoints, and berth its nuclear-powered aircraft carrier in its port, to say nothing of the high-level diplomatic engagements that followed, reflected the fact that France is becoming an increasingly strategic security partner for Indonesia.
This is not a recent development. During his tenure as Indonesia’s defense minister from 2019 to 2024, Prabowo made at least seven official visits to France, making it one of his most frequently visited foreign destinations. In 2021, security collaboration between the two nations was further institutionalized by the signing of a new Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA).
Why France?
Indonesian officials have explicitly explained the reasoning. During the DCA’s ratification hearing in June 2024, then Foreign Affairs Minister Retno Marsudi highlighted France’s status as a permanent member of the U.N. Security Council and the world’s second-largest arms exporter after the U.S. Likewise, at another hearing in September, Prabowo pointed out France’s status as a nuclear power. In this view, Indonesia’s move to intensify its defense engagement with France is not solely about bilateral cooperation but also an attempt to elevate its global geopolitical standing.
Furthermore, France’s pursuit of strategic autonomy, even while still being part of NATO and the Western bloc, presents it as a potential alternative geopolitical partner for countries such as Indonesia, which is seeking to diversify its strategic partnership beyond the U.S., Russia, and China.
France’s unique geopolitical footprint in the Indo-Pacific adds to its strategic value for Indonesia. Its territories in French Polynesia and New Caledonia provide Paris with a permanent stake and military presence in the region, unlike most European powers. As shown by the Clemenceau 25 Mission, France also has considerable ability to project additional military force and assets into the Indo-Pacific.
Meanwhile, France sees Indonesia as a key partner in the region due to, among other things, its size and strategic location, the latter of which was clearly demonstrated by the La Perouse 25 exercise. Simultaneously, economic interests play a big role. A major example is Indonesia’s choice to buy Rafale fighter jets and Scorpene Evolved submarines from France in a deal worth over $10 billion.
Hurdles Remain
While France and Indonesia are aiming to strengthen their defense partnership further, financial constraints continue to pose a significant challenge for Jakarta. Budget limitations have reportedly delayed certain arms procurement projects from France and other countries, thus raising concerns about Indonesia’s ability to sustain its long-term defense commitments.
Last month, the Indonesian Ministry of Defense announced a plan to gradually double the country’s defense spending, currently one of the lowest in ASEAN, to 1.5 percent of GDP. Nevertheless, the lack of a clear timeline or deadline casts doubt on how quickly these ambitions can be realized. In fact, an annual defense budget exceeding 1 percent of GDP has been discussed since at least 2009.
Moreover, the recent controversial decision to reallocate $18 billion of the government budget to Prabowo’s flagship programs, including his free meal and healthcare improvement programs, which the Ministry of Defense claims does not affect TNI’s procurement programs and operations, does not send a promising signal about Jakarta’s capacity to boost its defense spending considerably in the upcoming years. Another challenge comes from Jakarta’s aspiration to expand its defense ties with other major powers, including China and Russia. This move could potentially limit the attention and resources it can dedicate to France.
Prabowo’s administration has also introduced a new challenge: the militarization of civilian functions. TNI’s growing involvement in non-traditional defense activities has been witnessed in recent months, such as in Prabowo’s ambitious free meal program. On top of that, there is a proposal to establish 100 “territorial infantry battalions” to speed up regional development. Unlike regular military units, these battalions will consist of livestock, fisheries, agriculture, and health companies. In other words, these battalions are not designed for combat. Prabowo’s directive for TNI to help guard palm oil plantations further blurred the line between military and civilian matters.
Observers warn that this trend diverts military resources from defense priorities while weakening civilian institutions and supremacy. For Indonesia’s foreign partners, including France, this development could indicate a more inward-looking TNI with a reduced ability to engage in international defense initiatives.
From the French side, the hurdles include domestic political instability, particularly following the no-confidence vote in December, which could impact the country’s defense policy, and the war in Ukraine that continues to draw significant attention and resources.
Trump Factors
Further uncertainties in the Indonesia-France defense partnership might stem from President Donald Trump’s administration in Washington. With Trump’s “America First” foreign policy and the potential strain on transatlantic security ties, French President Emmanuel Macron is already calling for greater European defense autonomy. If Washington reduces military support to NATO, France and other European countries will have to invest more resources into filling the gap, a situation that would limit their ability to bolster their commitment to the Indo-Pacific.
The worst-case scenario for Indonesia would be a considerable disengagement between TNI and the U.S. military, particularly in response to Jakarta’s decision to join BRICS and deepen security ties with China. Paradoxically, this could open new opportunities for France to expand its role as a strategic defense partner for Indonesia by filling gaps left by the U.S. Clearly, this will not be a simple task as the U.S. has been Indonesia’s primary security partner for decades, thanks to both its willingness and its capacity to fulfill that role.
In the upcoming years, defense cooperation between Indonesia and France will continue to intensify. However, given the domestic uncertainties in both nations and broader international dynamics, it remains to be seen whether the Jakarta-Paris axis will receive the attention and resources it deserves.
