Brett McGurk is a CNN global affairs analyst who served in senior national security positions under Presidents George W. Bush, Barack Obama, Donald Trump and Joe Biden.
CNN —
After 12 extraordinary days in the Middle East, the crisis that began with Israel’s military and intelligence operations inside Iran and culminated with U.S. military forces targeting Iran’s main nuclear facilities, now appears to be receding. President Donald Trump last night announced a “ceasefire” later endorsed by both Israel and Iran, albeit not without final attacks by both countries and infliction of casualties.
Trump this morning expressed the frustration of many Middle East negotiators, saying neither country at this point knew “what the fuck they were doing” and calling on both to adhere to his ceasefire plan.
The precondition for this fledgling ceasefire was the direct US military attack against Iran’s nuclear facilities. As I’ve been discussing over the past week on CNN, to avoid mission creep and a meandering military campaign without clear objectives, it was important before Trump ordered an attack to be on the same page with Prime Minister Netanyahu of Israel — to make clear that an American attack was aimed to mark the beginning of the end of the crisis as opposed to the start of a new phase — and to effectively deter potential Iranian responses.
That appears to be precisely what has happened. Iran’s response to the first-ever direct US military attack into the heart of Iran — long predicted to be ferocious — was meager: about a dozen missiles telegraphed in advance with most shot down by US and Qatari defenses. It is hard to understate the significance of this now broken taboo of US policy, with Iran now understanding that the United States can and will reach deep into its territory when necessary to defend its personnel and its interests. Iran has long believed that its reliance on asymmetrical proxy warfare would avoid blowback inside its own borders.
That belief is now shattered.
Over 12 days, Iran lost all its air defenses, most of its missiles, the launchers it needs to deploy them and the plants it needs to build them; the echelon of its military command; and its crown jewel nuclear facilities together with its leading nuclear scientists. Iranian leaders who are still alive know that is so only because Israel and the United States chose to keep them around, to include Iran’s Supreme Leader, as Trump even said over the course of the crisis.
If nothing else, this has been a remarkable feat of Israeli military and intelligence proficiency, together with American military power that is unmatched globally.
The question now is whether this tactical success will translate into strategic gains, which I’d define as threefold: An Iran 1) that will never again dare lurch toward a nuclear weapon or stockpile highly enriched uranium with advanced centrifuges beyond any conceivable civilian-use case; 2) that will never again rebuild a massive missile arsenal to threaten Israel and US personnel throughout the Middle East; and 3) a weakened Iran that is unable or unwilling to rebuild and support its terrorist proxies across the region, such as Hezbollah in Lebanon, which has been defeated and notably sat out this recent crisis.
As for “regime change” in Tehran, that is ultimately up to the Iranian people. We can support them through means of communication such as Starlink and Virtual Private Networks (VPNs), but this should not be a declared military objective of the United States, or of Israel for two reasons. First, it is an objective beyond our means to deliver, and with unintended consequence as we have seen elsewhere over the last 20 years. Second, such a declared objective may rebound against the Iranian people most opposed to Iran’s repressive regime, enabling further crackdowns and human rights atrocities.
Iran’s regime after 46 years may well fall into the dustbin of history, as I believe it ultimately will, but that’s not what this crisis was about. The United States together with Israel should continue to remain focused on tight and achievable goals — missiles, military capacity and nuclear enrichment.
So, what should we watch for over the coming weeks?
After Hamas’ attacks on October 7, 2023, Israel’s national security doctrine is to act on any threat before it can gather. That explains its degradation of Hezbollah in Lebanon and its declared policy to never again allow Hamas to control Gaza. It also explains the logic and momentum behind Israel’s historic campaign against Iran over the last 12 days. The seeds of that campaign were planted when Iran made the fateful decision shortly after October 7 to join the war and support a multifront campaign against Israel.
The corollary to this doctrine is that once Israel gains an advantage over an adversary, it will not easily relinquish such advantage. That means Israel insists on retaining freedom to act against threats — even where (as in Lebanon with Hezbollah) there is a negotiated ceasefire in effect. We should presume that the same will apply in Iran and that Israel will continue to monitor threats and act against them whenever it deems necessary inside a country long dedicated to Israel’s destruction.
If Iran seeks to reconstitute its strategic air defenses or missile production capacity, or — the most serious case — its nuclear enrichment capacity, then we can assume Israel will act militarily against such reconstitution just as it does in Lebanon and elsewhere. This new equation in the Middle East is the result of the coordinated assault against Israel over the last 20 months, and Israel will insist on it regardless of what the US or anyone else might say or recommend as to how Israel should continue to defend itself.
This new equation will hinder Iran’s ability to recover from what has been its greatest military setback since the Iranian revolution that brought this regime to power 46 years ago. As noted, it’s hard to understate the unprecedented nature of such a visible setback to Iran’s revolutionary system, which continues to be nurtured in hostility to its declared Great Satan (the United States) and Little Satan (Israel).
Victory laps in the Middle East can come back to haunt any president and Trump should be wary of declaring an irreversible success. No doubt, this short crisis was well managed and well handled by Trump and his national security team, but the ultimate judgment is far from rendered. The Trump team also had a lot going for it here, including strike options for Iran that had been developed and refined over the last four presidential administrations, as well as an Iran that was already in its weakest position historically by the time of Trump took office this year.
But even after 12 days of operations inside Iran, it has not “unconditionally surrendered” — as Trump had earlier demanded — and it may well retain some of its nuclear capacity. Iran also retains its hardline regime led by an isolated leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who has never traveled outside its borders and is likely sheltered without credible information or his most trusted advisers, many of whom are dead. There is a risk that in the aftermath of historic setbacks on his watch, Khamenei chooses to order clandestine efforts to produce a nuclear weapon, viewing such a weapon as now essential for the survival of his regime.
That would be far more difficult for Iran to do if US military strikes eliminated or significantly degraded Iran’s enrichment capacity and the cascades needed to produce weapons-grade uranium, as the Trump administration claims. It would also be hard to keep a secret. But it would not be impossible.
Over the coming days and weeks, we will likely learn more about what remains of Iran’s nuclear capabilities. This will be an intensive area of focus for American and Israeli intelligence professionals, and we may not know the results for some time. It’s important to allow these professionals to do their work without political interference or pressure from Washington or Jerusalem. To ensure the tactical successes of this week translate into strategic gains, we must know and deal with whatever is left of Iran’s program.
Iran may also begin to have an internal debate about whether to reconstitute its nuclear enrichment capacity — at massive expense even while the country remains desperately poor — and perhaps move to restore its weaponization program. That would be a serious mistake, with risk of an Israeli and/or American re-attack and crippling international sanctions, but Iran has already made a series of strategic mistakes and miscalculations particularly from October 7 onward, so it’s something to consider and warn against.
Ultimately, the only way to fully ensure Iran never moves toward a bomb is extensive intelligence work and a diplomatic arrangement to ensure full access for inspectors and strict limitations on any nuclear activity that is not strictly for civilian use. Without a deal of some kind, Iran’s activities will proceed in the dark.
Before this crisis, there was an American-backed deal on the table that reportedly would have permitted Iran to retain very low enrichment capacity in aboveground facilities for a temporary period as an international consortium was established to cooperatively enrich fuel with full transparency and monitoring. Iran did not take that deal and what it might get now will surely be far worse from its vantage point — to include no enrichment at all inside Iran, even for a temporary period as had been proposed.
Iran will balk at this, but it has lost most of its leverage. In addition, the French and the UK have the authority under UN Security Council Resolution 2331, which endorsed the Obama-era nuclear deal, known as the JCPOA, to “snapback” all international sanctions on Iran if diplomacy fails, thereby retuning Iran to the multilateral sanctions regime it confronted before the JCPOA. Iran has made clear that it’s deeply concerned over such a possibility, and it has even threatened — before this crisis — to leave the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty if snapback is invoked.
This snapback authority, however, expires in October and needs to be executed before then to take effect. Thus, the end of August has always been seen as the deadline for diplomacy. It’s my understanding that London and Paris are committed to this snapback procedure as it offers an important form of leverage and a natural end point to the diplomacy that’s likely to begin soon. So, look for diplomacy on what’s left of Iran’s nuclear program to heat up this summer and reach a point of decision before Labor Day weekend.
There is also a deal on the table for a 60-day ceasefire in Gaza with an aim to secure a permanent end to the war if Hamas will release half the living hostages (10 out of 20) that it still holds. Hamas rejected this deal, choosing to remain in its tunnels as civilians suffer above and to holdout for its ultimate demand, which has remained the same since October 7: agreement by Israel that Hamas remains in power in Gaza.
Such an agreement from Israel will never come. That is why Washington, across two administrations, has sought a phased process whereby the fighting stops and hostages come home as negotiations proceed about the ultimate resolution of the war with a new Palestinian-led political and security structure in Gaza.
After the events of the last 12 days, is that even possible? Yes, and perhaps more so.
Hamas cut the three-phase ceasefire deal in January after Hezbollah, with its leadership eliminated, succumbed to pressure and its own ceasefire deal with Israel. With Iran — the ultimate benefactor for these terrorist groups — now under unprecedented pressure as well, and most of Hamas’ leadership now dead, the table is set for a restored ceasefire in Gaza. Hamas has sent a delegation to Cairo to discuss the current proposal once again, and sources tell me a deal is close. Israel may even join the talks soon.
For everyone who wants this war in Gaza to stop, there should be a resounding call on Hamas to release 10 hostages. If it does so, the war stops immediately. There is no shortcut beyond the deal now on the table, and closing it should remain a priority of US diplomacy with support from allies and partners.
A 60-day ceasefire in Gaza together with an intensive period of diplomacy on whatever is left of Iran’s nuclear program carries potential to resolve the regional crisis that Hamas unleashed 20 months ago and to do so in a manner that neither Hamas nor Iran intended. Israel with US support has emerged over this period as the regional power that Iran had long sought — but failed — to become.
Resolving the Gaza crisis would open space for the Saudis to again consider establishing diplomatic ties with Israel together with a peace process between Israelis and Palestinians. That is a central demand of Riyadh’s and conceivable in exchange for the Saudi deal, especially if Israel over the coming year forms a broader and more centrist governing coalition following elections that could be held soon and no later than next year.
But this is the Middle East. Nothing will move in a linear direction. Optimists will be disappointed. But the last 12 days proved the usual pessimists (with predictions of all-out war) wrong as well. The future is likely in the middle, between new and real potential, and always-present peril. How and whether the White House follows through on the opportunities at the end of this crisis presents will determine where we land.
