Malicious interference with the United States Global Positioning System (GPS) is a potentially fatal safety hazard that demands immediate attention and unified action.
As the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency states, “Positioning, Navigation, and Timing (PNT) is necessary for the functioning of the nation’s critical infrastructure. Whether for civil, commercial, or military use, nearly all sectors rely on accurate PNT information to provide services.” In many cases, GPS is the sole source of PNT data, making these sectors extremely vulnerable to GPS interference.
Geopolitical conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East have dramatically increased GPS jamming and spoofing, which are common tactics in combat zones. Effective defense against jamming and spoofing attacks requires government agencies and mission partners to geolocate interference sources, predict interference patterns and distinguish between accidental and intentional interference.
Given the potentially catastrophic consequences of GPS interference, commercial space organizations, U.S. space agencies and international partners must work in tandem to ensure safe and secure PNT services. Developing advanced technologies, establishing clear policies and allocating necessary resources to enact those policies will empower the international space community to combat space-based security threats.
GPS jamming vs GPS spoofing
Spoofing and jamming are two ways adversaries disrupt PNT services and solutions derived from GPS, requiring different approaches to combat each successfully.
Intentional GPS spoofing is a malicious technique that manipulates GPS data to misrepresent an object’s location. To spoof a receiver, an adversary needs to recreate the signals from multiple satellites and then transmit the spoofed signals.
Conversely, GPS jamming does not require accurate recreation of GPS signals. To jam a receiver, adversaries use transmitters to create radio frequency signals at an equal or higher frequency than the GPS signal, rendering the receivers useless.
GPS jamming is easier and more common than spoofing, but the consequences of spoofing are more severe as users typically can’t tell their navigation is being manipulated. For example, a malicious actor could use GPS spoofing to lead an aircraft into dangerous territory without raising red flags.
Given our nation’s reliance on GPS for military, civil and commercial PNT services, both threats require immediate action.
Recommendations to combat GPS interference
Space and defense agencies must have an accurate and comprehensive picture of the space domain to tackle the growing threat of GPS interference successfully. With sufficient satellite data, agencies can detect abnormal activity and address these threats before it’s too late. True space domain awareness enables agencies to spot degradation signals and create a near-real-time picture of GPS jamming at any moment.
However, space is increasingly congested, with over 10,000 satellites currently in low Earth orbit (LEO), making adequate data collection and analysis challenging. Given the thousands of satellites in LEO, it would be nearly impossible for human satellite operators to monitor all this data and identify GPS interference threats. This is where AI comes into play.
Simultaneously managing and analyzing all this satellite data requires advanced AI algorithms that make sense of vast quantities of information. AI can detect and flag GPS threats and even differentiate between unintentional interference and nefarious acts, saving invaluable time for satellite operators monitoring PNT interference.
Fortunately, agencies like the U.S. Space Force’s Space Systems Command are taking steps to embed AI into their GPS spoofing and jamming detection systems with programs like PNT – Secure Electronic Navigation Threat Intelligence and Location (PNT-SENTINEL).
To eradicate GPS threats, continued coordination between the public and private sectors and between the U.S. and our allies is essential.
Sustainable GPS Modernization
In addition to harnessing AI to detect GPS interference, the space and defense communities are looking at ways to fortify GPS infrastructure itself. For example, the Department of Defense is working to develop a military-specific signal known as “M-code.” M-code is a secure, encrypted GPS signal designed to resist jamming and spoofing and improve GPS data accuracy in contested environments.
According to a 2024 Government Accountability Office report, the DOD is facing manufacturing and testing delays, jeopardizing its goal to have 24 M-code-capable satellites in continuous operation through the 2030s. The public and private sectors must work together to make M-code a reality by accelerating production for microchips and cards that process M-code signals. In addition to cross-sector collaboration, international cooperation is key to ensure sustainable, secure space-based PNT services.
As with many space-based threats, no single organization or country can overcome spoofing and jamming challenges alone. The U.S. and its allies should form a Space Security Accord recognizing space assets as critical national security infrastructure, an essential move to adequately respond to space-based security threats like GPS interference. An accord of this nature would establish protocols to protect space assets and outline shared responsibilities among nations.
Sustained partnership between the public and private sectors is necessary to develop, field, operate and maintain multiple PNT services. The only way to solve issues pertaining to GPS — with worldwide ramifications and an extraterrestrial infrastructure — is to work together.
Tim Solms is the CEO of Slingshot Aerospace.
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